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A regulation established jointly between SNIAS and the
Official French Service requires failure probability for any
individual helicopter part below or equal to 10 to the minus
6th power.
In this article,	 the method used at SN:'.iS to calculate
the global risk of rupture is described.
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FATIGUE ANALYSIS OF COMPOSITE MATERIALS USI14G THE FAIL-SAFE CONCEPT
by G. Stievenard
Aerospatiale Helicopter Division
0.	 INTRODUCTION
The helicopter by design presents numerous sources of vibratory
excitation and as a result many components are under stress loads.
The main concern of the manufacturer is to produce components that
meet highly strict safety requirements while remaining competitive
in terms of mass and cost-price consideraticns. A fatigue regula-
tion established jointly between SNIAS and Official French Services
requires that the individual failure probability of a helicopter
component must not exceed 10 -G
 during a given lifespan.
The development of composite materials over the past fifteen
years has made it possible for Aerospatiale to desi gn new rotors
that meet the specifications of the abovementioned regulation.
These materials nave a good fatigue life with evident fail-
­ 47 - characteristics (easily detectable onset of delamination and
slow propagation speed).
These properties have made it possible to develop methods of
analysis without increasing the risk of failure during flight.
If we let R1 be the probability of having a crack on a flight
component and R2 be the probability of seeing this crack propagate
between two scheduled inspections, the global failure risk is the
product of R1 x R2 and it is this product that must not exceed i0-6
The objective of this report is to describe the method used by
SNIAS permitting the calculation of these two risks R1 and R2.
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SDynamic
Stress
This method is based on a full study of fatigue characteris-
tics and crack propagation rates in the material used.
1.	 CALCULATION OF RISK R1 (Risk of Having a Crack During Operation)
The first stage of the study consists of determining the equa-
tion of the SIN curve of the material used to manuf actur^^ the heli-
copter component. These equations are generally expressed as shown
in fi gure 1 below:
	
M e9acycL"	 N
Fig. 1
From the tests of samples performed in fairly large numbers,
;t is possible to calculate the coefficients A and alpha which are
characteristic of a material. The method used is a linear regression
along log N as a function of set S (fig. 2):
log N - log A - log s
	
a	 a
log N
Fig. 2
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The second calculation hypothesis consists of assuming that
there are S/N curves correlated to the mean curve of the same
equati-)n A which follow a normal law of logarithmic probability.
These curves are therefore curves of crack isoprobability
(fig. 3) :
tS
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This hypothesis which may seem arbitrary at first is well
verified by the experiment and statistical testing.
The experiment that we have just described woald be too costly
if it were performed entirely on aircraft components. Also, the equa-
tion of the S/N curve is determined on specimens and is considered	 i
to be applicable to only a few specimens of the components we are
testing (G iaini pts) fig. 4:
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Formulation of the Calculations
(1) s - Ai
Na
(2) 1106 Al m = E log A.
a	 t ..
a	 d
(3) loag Ar	 = lloq Al , 	Krl_	 —
b	 c	 e
(4)V_
n - 1
(5) K	 kr + k^ 1	 1	
k,?	
+	
kr?
:	 ((	 _	 _
	
Y " ll -1^ 	 r?
2(n-1)
Key: a-Number of test points; b-risk under consideration;
c dean fatigue limit at 10 6 cycles; d-standard devia-
tion; e-Normal law coefficient (5).
Fig. 5
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i
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kr - margin corresponding to risk r in the simple normal relationship.
kq - margin corresponding to risk q in the simple normal relationship.
4	
q = coefficient of confidence.
Knowing the 6 test results, it is now possible to calculate Am
and the Ar's corresponding to different risks r.
Operational characteristics of a helicopter are known, either
by recording flight parameters during several hundres of hours or
by information obtained from users. We thus have a spectrum giving
for each flight configuration the percentage of time corresponding
to it. For each of these configurations, the flight stresses are
recorded using extensometric gages.
These stresses associated with their percentage serve to
calculate the lifespan by applying the MINER relationship	 (see
fig.	 6) . Table 1
a b	 c e
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Key: a-% use; b-Flight stress; c-Fatigue limit at risk r; d-Number
of allowable cycles; e-Number of flight hours N x t per Mc
(t: time for t Megacycle); f-Hovering; g-Vi transition;
h-Level flight; i-Approach; j -Landing. I.- :
.lean time between Aailure
Fig. 6
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2 - CALCULATION OF RISK R2 (Risk of having a catastrophic failure
betweer_ two scheduled inspections)
The tests performed on components to calculate risk R1 are
suspended at the first sign of damage and are resumed f,-)r flight
loads using a program block and taking into account:
-the percentage each configuration is used,
-the chronological order of these configurations (in order to
reproduce possible delay effects of the propagation due to changes
in stress levels).
(See load spectrum on Table II fig. 8).
These tests were carried ont to the failure point with measure-
ments and recording of crack lengtns and resistance of the components.
If we cal]. o if the time elapse between time t. corresponding to
the appearance of the first small damage and time t  corresponding
to catastrophic failure, it is possible to match a probability
relationship to this random variable ti if found during the test.
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Tabl-- Ii
Spectrum of Programmed Loads
Static Dynamic	 Static Dynamic No.	 of
Flapping Flapping	 Drag Drag Cycles
— 235 0
M ±	 79	 145.5 =	 tt8 320
b 84 ± 168	 100 170 175
c 63.5 s	 69.5	 29 z	 75 224
d 105 s 149,s	 172 s 410.5 643 83.5 2	 28	 1(0 = 138 465
f 105 149.5	 17: s 410.5 64
63.5 *	 28	 100 = 136 46°
105 s	 149.5	 172 2 410.5 M
1 83.5 ±	 31.5	 258 `- 168 384
105 119.5	 172 410.5 81
90 31.5	 258 '_ 166 384
1 74 x	 49	 201 =	 173.5 61
m 96 35	 158 '- 176 4
n 90 ±	 313	 258 '- 168 364
O 83.5 s	 28	 100 x 138 465
p 105 ±	 149.5	 172 : 410.5 64
q 533 69.5	 100 z 136 224
r 105 ± 1493	 172 410.5 w
s M s 168	 100 170 175
t 61 = 109	 277 x 110 64
u 64 s	 79	 145.5 s 118 320
v 74 = 126	 132.5 s 201.5 320
w — 235 0	 0 6
Key:	 a-Hovering; b-Take -off;	 c-minimum cruise speed;
d-Turning; e-Lconomy cruise speed; f-Turning; g-Economy
cruise speed; h- Turning;	 i-Maximum cruise speed;	 j-Turn-
ing;	 k- Maximum cruise speed;	 1-VNE; m-VNL• turning;
n-Maximum cruise speed;	 o-Economy cruise speed;	 p-Turn-
ing;	 q- Minimum cruise speed;	 r-Turning; s -Speed reduc-
tion; t-Autorotation; u-Hovering; v-Approach; w-Rotor
stop.
Essentially, it seems that the normal logarithmic relationship
fits the phenomenon the best.
Since we know the law of probability, the mean value tifm
and the standard deviation, it is possible to calculate the
allowable flight time as a function of risk (see fig. 9)
The curve thus plotted corresponds to the risk of failure by
considering that the first damage was noticed right after take-off.
The curve of risk R2 should therefore be evaluated by assuming that	 j
this first damage may occur at any moment of flight.
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If we let x be the flight hours between two inspections, we
have two possible cases:
(a) No damage appears between two given inspections (this
case is not of interest to us since it carries over to case b)
during the next inspections:
(b) Damage does appear between two inspections. Only this
case is of interest to us. We will therefore let the probability
of damage appearing be equal to 1. I.e. t l is the instant in which
the first noticeable damage appears (t counting from zero of the
last inspection) and t 2 is the propagation time bringing about
catastrophic damage to the component. It should be pointed out that
t  and t 2
 are two independent variables.
Probability Ix " i x « dx } - dx
X
according to the preceding curve
= a
Probability	 ^ La < x - xl - R ( X - x)
where	 dP n dx . R (X - x)X 
/
P(x) n t	 J X 	 (X - x) . dx-R2X 0 
This is the mean value from 0 to X of the function R2
explained previously (see fig. 10).
-6-
Rs
Failure probability by
assuming that the 1st
/	 damage occurs at the
Ri	 / beginning of the flight. = b
Failure probability by
assuming that the 1st
damage occurs at an y time
~ R >,	 during the flight.	 c
l
3 - CALCULATION OF RISK R (Or Risk of Failure During Flinht)
As we have al;aady mentioned, this risk is found by multiplying
R1 X R2, the calculation me-►hod of which we have just described.
R1 and R2 are presented in the form of two curves. The manu-
facturer therefore has several possible choices, either to assign
a long lifespan with frequent scheduled inspections of the component,
or, conversely, a short lifespan with very spaced inspections.
Meat is even better, these curves make it possible to modulate
the inspection periods as a function of the component's flight
time (fig. 11) .
LIFE
S pA l * TOTAL
t 000 h too h 10	 • to	 7	 10	 •
2 000 h 50 h t0 + 10	 0	 t0
5000h 10h 10	 7i 10	 4 i	 10	 •
*Periods between inspections
Fig. 11
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